Carlos Pérez
(V&L)
La prestigiosa publicación semanal Embassy de Canadá, destinada a la política exterior, acaba de lanzar un artículo en el que analiza los entretelones de las negociaciones para intercambiar 45 personas secuestradas por la guerrilla colombiana FARC, por 500 guerrilleros actualmente detenidos en prisiones de Colombia.
Entre los 45 prisioneros se encuentra Ingrid Betancourt, ex candidata presidencial que ya lleva más de 5 años secuestrada. La liberación de Beteancourt ha sido pedida expresamente a la guerrilla por el presidente de Francia, Nicolás Sarkowsky, y está siendo negociada por el presidente Chávez.
El analista Vladimir Torres cuestiona el hecho de que Chávez esté negociando con una guerrilla que ha cometido atrocidades suficientemente documentadas, y advierte que en realidad la ganancia buscada por el mandatario venezolano sea ganar prestigio y adhesiones al llamado Polo Democrático Alternativo, la alianza de izquierda que pudiera triunfar en las elecciones presidenciales de 2010 en Colombia, hecho que significaría un mayor poder para controlar la política colombiana para Chávez.
A continuación ofrecemos el texto original del análisis de la revista Embassy.
The Risks of Negotiating with Terrorists
By Vladimir Torres
Last week's release of the 19 Korean hostages by the Taliban in Afghanistan, following direct negotiations and an alleged $20 million (US) ransom paid by Seoul, raised once again the question: Should we negotiate with terrorists? The newly appointed Canadian Foreign Minister, Maxime Bernier, made a very clear statement: "We do not negotiate with terrorists, for any reason. Such negotiations, even if unsuccessful, only lead to further acts of terrorism."
As much as I share the principled stance in this specific case, there are circumstances when the question is more complex and demands a more nuanced response. In the search for peace and an end to the decades-long conflict in Colombia, the government of President Alvaro Uribe is willing to negotiate with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and has agreed to enrol Venezuela's Hugo Chavez as facilitator. But what is at stake, which outcomes could be considered successful, and for whom?
At a bilateral meeting on Aug. 31, Uribe agreed that Chavez would initiate direct talks in Caracas with an envoy of the FARC. The objective is to reach an agreement on what Colombians have named the "humanitarian exchange." This is not peace, much less an end to the conflict, but would see 45 civilian hostages kidnapped by the FARC released in exchange for some 500 imprisoned guerrilla members. One of the hostages, held captive for more than five years, is Ingrid Betancourt, a former presidential candidate and a French national with dual citizenship
Prior to the Uribe-Chavez meeting, expectations and speculation were running high. In the preceding days, Chavez had met in Caracas with Uribe's envoy, Colombian opposition Senator Piedad Cordova, and with relatives of the kidnapped. Chavez addressed the leader of the FARC on television, calling on him to send a clear signal of acceptance of the mediation. French President Nicholas Sarkozy had telephoned both Chavez and Uribe. Many thought that an announcement of an agreement would come out of the two presidents' meeting. Not so. This is just the beginning of what could be a lengthy process.
Trade, Politics and Peace Talks
What brings together these two neighbouring countries' leaders, despite being at two different ends of the political spectrum, has more to do with the importance of bilateral dealings. From Uribe's point of view, the intense and increasing bilateral trade–estimated to reach $5 billion (US) for 2007–heavily favours Colombia, and for as long as Venezuela continues to enjoy the oil revenues, dismantles its domestic industrial capacity, and imports everything, the sweeter the deal becomes. Chavez knows that Venezuela needs the bilateral trade, yet he has longer-term ambitions for Colombian domestic politics, in the context of his South American leadership aspirations.
Make no mistake: the FARC is a terrorist organization financed through drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and other unlawful practices. Canada, the U.S. and the European Union list them as a terrorist organization. Chavez, though, has always refused to label them as such. The evidences of the atrocities by the FARC are abundant and unquestionable. As an example, only last July the independent international NGO Human Rights Watch issued a report documenting how the FARC is responsible for the increase in victims of landmines in Colombia; they manufacture the devices with readily available materials and leave them behind, indiscriminately killing and maiming civilians, mostly children.
The FARC have demanded other concessions in order to release the 45 hostages: the demilitarization of two regions in south western Colombia totalling approximately 800 square kilometres; the unconditional release of the 500 prisoners; and the repatriation of two of their leaders currently under trial in the U.S. for drug trafficking (their noms de guerre are Simon Trinidad and Sonia). Uribe, on the other hand, has expressed what he calls his "un-movables," namely: no demilitarised area–as one precedent of doing this some years ago was used by the FARC to regroup and launch renewed attacks, snubbing the peace talks; no recognition of belligerent status for the guerrillas; and that the prisoners would only be freed on condition of disposing arms and abandoning the guerrillas.
Slim Hope of Prisoner Exchange
One possible outcome of the negotiations could be the release of Ingrid Betancourt. If nothing else, the FARC could agree to this compromise to please the mediator. For Chavez, it would mean succeeding at what appears to be a heartfelt interest of the international community, and a much welcome temporary whitewash for his latest antidemocratic actions. Furthermore, the mediation gives Chavez the opportunity of meddling openly in Colombian internal affairs. It would be a boost for the Colombian left, particularly the Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), a party very much aligned with Chavez and friendly towards the guerrillas.
For the FARC guerrillas that historically have given ample signs of not being interested in peace at all–as it would mean among other things relinquishing the drug business–they would aim to obtain through the negotiations whatever concessions might come from the government. As for conquering political power, their hopes would be set on the 2010 elections, when a Chavez-financed PDA might win.
For Uribe, the likelihood of achieving the humanitarian exchange is limited. Sadly, this would be the only outcome that he could consider a complete success. In its absence, he can only hope that the process will expose once again the impossibility of negotiating in good faith with the FARC. For Uribe this negotiation attempt is very risky, and he might come to regret having opened the door to Chavez, even if it exposes the already well known ties the latter has with the FARC and the impunity with which they operate in Venezuelan territory. In the end, if you can't defeat the terrorists militarily, or you are not being directly blackmailed, maybe you have to negotiate.
Vladimir Torres is an Ottawa-based Latin American affairs analyst.
(Link: http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2007/september/5/torres/)
(V&L)
La prestigiosa publicación semanal Embassy de Canadá, destinada a la política exterior, acaba de lanzar un artículo en el que analiza los entretelones de las negociaciones para intercambiar 45 personas secuestradas por la guerrilla colombiana FARC, por 500 guerrilleros actualmente detenidos en prisiones de Colombia.
Entre los 45 prisioneros se encuentra Ingrid Betancourt, ex candidata presidencial que ya lleva más de 5 años secuestrada. La liberación de Beteancourt ha sido pedida expresamente a la guerrilla por el presidente de Francia, Nicolás Sarkowsky, y está siendo negociada por el presidente Chávez.
El analista Vladimir Torres cuestiona el hecho de que Chávez esté negociando con una guerrilla que ha cometido atrocidades suficientemente documentadas, y advierte que en realidad la ganancia buscada por el mandatario venezolano sea ganar prestigio y adhesiones al llamado Polo Democrático Alternativo, la alianza de izquierda que pudiera triunfar en las elecciones presidenciales de 2010 en Colombia, hecho que significaría un mayor poder para controlar la política colombiana para Chávez.
A continuación ofrecemos el texto original del análisis de la revista Embassy.
The Risks of Negotiating with Terrorists
By Vladimir Torres
Last week's release of the 19 Korean hostages by the Taliban in Afghanistan, following direct negotiations and an alleged $20 million (US) ransom paid by Seoul, raised once again the question: Should we negotiate with terrorists? The newly appointed Canadian Foreign Minister, Maxime Bernier, made a very clear statement: "We do not negotiate with terrorists, for any reason. Such negotiations, even if unsuccessful, only lead to further acts of terrorism."
As much as I share the principled stance in this specific case, there are circumstances when the question is more complex and demands a more nuanced response. In the search for peace and an end to the decades-long conflict in Colombia, the government of President Alvaro Uribe is willing to negotiate with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) and has agreed to enrol Venezuela's Hugo Chavez as facilitator. But what is at stake, which outcomes could be considered successful, and for whom?
At a bilateral meeting on Aug. 31, Uribe agreed that Chavez would initiate direct talks in Caracas with an envoy of the FARC. The objective is to reach an agreement on what Colombians have named the "humanitarian exchange." This is not peace, much less an end to the conflict, but would see 45 civilian hostages kidnapped by the FARC released in exchange for some 500 imprisoned guerrilla members. One of the hostages, held captive for more than five years, is Ingrid Betancourt, a former presidential candidate and a French national with dual citizenship
Prior to the Uribe-Chavez meeting, expectations and speculation were running high. In the preceding days, Chavez had met in Caracas with Uribe's envoy, Colombian opposition Senator Piedad Cordova, and with relatives of the kidnapped. Chavez addressed the leader of the FARC on television, calling on him to send a clear signal of acceptance of the mediation. French President Nicholas Sarkozy had telephoned both Chavez and Uribe. Many thought that an announcement of an agreement would come out of the two presidents' meeting. Not so. This is just the beginning of what could be a lengthy process.
Trade, Politics and Peace Talks
What brings together these two neighbouring countries' leaders, despite being at two different ends of the political spectrum, has more to do with the importance of bilateral dealings. From Uribe's point of view, the intense and increasing bilateral trade–estimated to reach $5 billion (US) for 2007–heavily favours Colombia, and for as long as Venezuela continues to enjoy the oil revenues, dismantles its domestic industrial capacity, and imports everything, the sweeter the deal becomes. Chavez knows that Venezuela needs the bilateral trade, yet he has longer-term ambitions for Colombian domestic politics, in the context of his South American leadership aspirations.
Make no mistake: the FARC is a terrorist organization financed through drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and other unlawful practices. Canada, the U.S. and the European Union list them as a terrorist organization. Chavez, though, has always refused to label them as such. The evidences of the atrocities by the FARC are abundant and unquestionable. As an example, only last July the independent international NGO Human Rights Watch issued a report documenting how the FARC is responsible for the increase in victims of landmines in Colombia; they manufacture the devices with readily available materials and leave them behind, indiscriminately killing and maiming civilians, mostly children.
The FARC have demanded other concessions in order to release the 45 hostages: the demilitarization of two regions in south western Colombia totalling approximately 800 square kilometres; the unconditional release of the 500 prisoners; and the repatriation of two of their leaders currently under trial in the U.S. for drug trafficking (their noms de guerre are Simon Trinidad and Sonia). Uribe, on the other hand, has expressed what he calls his "un-movables," namely: no demilitarised area–as one precedent of doing this some years ago was used by the FARC to regroup and launch renewed attacks, snubbing the peace talks; no recognition of belligerent status for the guerrillas; and that the prisoners would only be freed on condition of disposing arms and abandoning the guerrillas.
Slim Hope of Prisoner Exchange
One possible outcome of the negotiations could be the release of Ingrid Betancourt. If nothing else, the FARC could agree to this compromise to please the mediator. For Chavez, it would mean succeeding at what appears to be a heartfelt interest of the international community, and a much welcome temporary whitewash for his latest antidemocratic actions. Furthermore, the mediation gives Chavez the opportunity of meddling openly in Colombian internal affairs. It would be a boost for the Colombian left, particularly the Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), a party very much aligned with Chavez and friendly towards the guerrillas.
For the FARC guerrillas that historically have given ample signs of not being interested in peace at all–as it would mean among other things relinquishing the drug business–they would aim to obtain through the negotiations whatever concessions might come from the government. As for conquering political power, their hopes would be set on the 2010 elections, when a Chavez-financed PDA might win.
For Uribe, the likelihood of achieving the humanitarian exchange is limited. Sadly, this would be the only outcome that he could consider a complete success. In its absence, he can only hope that the process will expose once again the impossibility of negotiating in good faith with the FARC. For Uribe this negotiation attempt is very risky, and he might come to regret having opened the door to Chavez, even if it exposes the already well known ties the latter has with the FARC and the impunity with which they operate in Venezuelan territory. In the end, if you can't defeat the terrorists militarily, or you are not being directly blackmailed, maybe you have to negotiate.
Vladimir Torres is an Ottawa-based Latin American affairs analyst.
(Link: http://www.embassymag.ca/html/index.php?display=story&full_path=/2007/september/5/torres/)
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